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“ROAD RULES”: ANALYZING 
TRAFFIC SIGNS THROUGH A SOCIO-
COGNITIVE APPROACH
abstract
Around 1.3 million people die every year because of road traffic crashes. Although safety rules, vehicle 
standards and post-accident health care, have all seen significant improvement, rising population and 
quick motorization rates have added to the casualty numbers. Road safety has been included among 
the Sustainable Development Goals, but the target set of halving the number of road deaths by 2020 
will be missed. With the emergent attention to road safety, several approaches may be adopted. One is 
tightening penalties to induce more prudent behavior. The second is to improve protection devices and 
vehicles. The third is to adapt road designs, including roadside signs, to modern roads and vehicles and to 
human behavior. This last approach in particular is the one where I think that substantial improvements 
may still be achieved. One of the most interesting aspects in terms of impact and effectiveness of rules, 
may be understood by focusing on the cognition process of the rule that is incorporated into a road sign, 
and by how this cognition can be framed so that voluntary compliance is enhanced. Road signs have 
always made extensive use of explanatory images. But it is also the unconscious social pressure that one’s 
driving behavior is being watched that produces compliance. A normative-semiotic perspective should be 
integrated by a cognitive perspective, so that insights from both the natural and the social sciences may 
achieve higher degrees of precision and predictability.
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ANALYZING TRAFFIC SIGNS THROUGH A SOCIO-COGNITIVE APPROACH
In this article I will consider the non-linguistic rules represented by road signs that regulate 
the circulation of vehicles and pedestrians on public roads. In the first place I will try to 
delimit the field, and define the kinds of norms present in road signs. Secondly, I will try 
to understand how traffic signals influence human behavior, based on socio-psychological 
research and some recent neurocognitive discoveries. Thirdly, I will hazard some predictions, 
based also on ongoing research, with respect to what may be the directives of change for road 
safety and traffic organization.
The approach I intend to adopt is a socio-cognitive one. Although choices and decisions taken 
by a driver can be considered as eminently individual, and mainly influenced by biological-
genetic cognitive factors (attention span, visual acuity, submissiveness and tendency to 
obedience, impulsiveness and aggressiveness), the way in which these attitudes are expressed
 is undoubtedly influenced by the social context and by what is derived from it (tendency to 
conformism, weight attributed to reputation, knowledge and respect for social norms). These 
factors in turn feed-back into the fundamental structures that determine our basic individual 
behaviors.
Because the dynamic underlying the law is also bio-social (Cominelli 2018), one of the 
approaches that does not risk neglecting any of these fundamental factors is therefore that 
which considers these types of norms as functioning in an ecological bio-social context.  
According to a World Health Organization report (WHO, 2018), around 1.3 million people die 
every year because of road traffic crashes. This means that around 3.700 people, or around 
one person every 23 seconds, dies for causes related to transit. Many more (in the number of 
tens of millions) are injured or permanently disabled. These figures have increased on a global 
scale in recent years. In relative terms, road risk is decreasing in developed countries but it’s 
increasing exponentially in developing countries, where it is three times as high. Between 
2013 and 2016, road deaths slightly diminished in 48 middle and high income countries, while 
they went  up in 104 countries, most of them in the low-income group. Although levels of 
safety rules, higher vehicle standards and post-accident health care, have all seen significant 
improvement, rising population and quick motorization rates have added to the casualty 
numbers (WHO 2018). Road safety has been included among the Sustainable Development 
Goals, but the target set of halving the number of road deaths by 2020 will most certainly be 
missed (Target 3.6 of the SDG). Road design and safety measures for cyclists and pedestrians in 
particular represent the hardest hurdle for developing countries, while the increasingly better 
1. Introduction
2. Road safety
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quality of pavements has allowed cars and trucks to increase their speed, which was earlier 
limited by the poor conditions of roads.
Leaving aside the fortuitous cases, and those cases where a defective vehicle or road 
infrastructure is to blame, accidents happen because of negligence and violation of the 
rules of circulation. Most harmful events are related to these violations, and may be directly 
attributed to speeding, drunk driving, or lack in the use of restraining or safety measures 
such as helmets, safety belts and child seats. The Dutch Institute for Road Safety Research 
estimated that just respecting the speed limit would decrease the number of casualties by 
25-30% (Wegman et al., 2007). The inability to recognize road hazards has been considered as 
contributing to around 25-50% of accidents (Charlton, 2006, p. 496). 
Despite the fact that road traffic crashes are now the eighth leading cause of death at the 
global level (and the first cause of death for people aged between 5 and 29 years), the diluted 
nature of such accidents lowers the perception of this risk in the public eye, and makes 
infractions to road safety rules as a minor offence in common perception. While shooting a 
gun recklessly in the middle of the street bears serious consequences for the shooter, speeding 
your car in a city is not normally frowned upon that much. Up until some years ago, even 
if road safety had been an issue in the public debate for more than a century (McMurtry, 
1915), the social disvalue of reckless driving and negligent behavior behind the wheel was 
underestimated. The situation is now changing, due to the perception of human life and health 
as something sacred, but only when serious harm happens, that same negligent behavior takes 
on a higher social disvalue. For their weight and speed, motor vehicles can be considered a 
weapon to handle with particular care, and this chance is reflected in the fact that vehicular 
“homicide”, in the form of “vehicular manslaughter”, has begun to appear in several 
jurisdictions, where it now stands between voluntary murder and manslaughter (Dahl, 2004; 
Massaro, 2016). 
As difficult as it may seem, some have attempted to measure the material and immaterial costs 
of road accidents. In the Netherlands, one of the countries in the world with the safest roads, it 
was calculated that society at large bore a staggering cost of 12,3 billion of Euros, amounting to 
2,6% of the Gross National Product (Wegman et al., 2007, 324). 
With the emergent attention to road safety, several approaches may be adopted. One is 
tightening penalties to induce more prudent behavior. The second is to improve protection 
devices, forcing drivers and passengers to wear helmets or safety belts, to subject vehicles to 
periodic checks, to forbid the consumption of alcohol or other psychotropic substances even 
in moderate quantities before driving, and to prohibit any tool that may distract drivers. The 
third is to adapt road designs, including roadside signs, to modern roads and vehicles. This 
last approach in particular is the one where I think that substantial improvements may still be 
achieved, especially if policy changes will incorporate the insights of sociology and cognitive 
science on how individual and social behavior intersect. 
Road signs convey norms of circulation. Road signs are expressed in a symbolical language, 
that through the conventional combination of pictures, writing, color and shapes, 
communicate rules. It is different from verbalized language, at least in length, as it cannot use 
the most complex syntactic constructions, because it needs to be seen and understood in most 
cases in a short time span. Different expressions have been used for this kind of normativity, 
such as “graphic rules” (Moroni & Lorini, 2017) or “pictorial law” (Boehme-Neßler, 2010). 
Some put the origin of this law of images in the ius imaginum of the ancient Rome, where 
heraldic arms and the hierarchy or precedence in military, social and ecclesiastical affairs 
was visualized in banners, coats, liveries, short inscriptions or insignia (Goodrich, 2014, p. 3). 
Colors, figures and combinations were also a part of it. It all indicated foremost the difference 
3. What are road 
signs?
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between what was familiar and friendly, and what was instead hostile and foreign (Goodrich, 
2014, pp. 4-5). 
During a subsequent phase, and with the process of rationalization of the law (Weber, 1995), 
legal systems have increasingly become skeptical of “regulation through images”. Formalized 
and analytical language seemed to be at this point the best way to orient and control social 
behavior (Boehme-Neßler, 2010, p. 90, p. 101). During this historical time, eliciting behavior 
by vivid and salient images started to be in contradiction with the Cartesian rationality of 
human legal action. Pictures and images in a rational discourse could be considered at best 
decorative and primitive. According to the legal common sense, pictorial law had to be the 
exception, save for some limited cases (urban planning, zoning, patent and brand ownership), 
and it had to be avoided as intrinsically subjective, if not “linked with sensuality, sin, emotions 
and irrationality” (Boehme-Neßler, 2010, p. 107). Visual signs, and foremost road signs, must 
then be clearly regulated in details through technical annexes that define the minutiae and 
specifications that pictures need to respect in order to be considered binding. 
And yet, due to their immediate salience, pictures are being rediscovered as a means to convey 
normative messages. The legal world is taking notice: graphic illustrations are still quite rare 
in legal briefs and court judgements, but these habits are changing, as time constraints are 
turning communication into something less verbal and more visual 1. 
Images have a potential impact which cannot be ignored. Visual representations are harder 
to challenge than verbalized concepts. An image can be complex, and its contradiction 
“dissipates without having any effect, because it can only ever deal with a small, limited 
aspect of the image at a time” (Boehme-Neßler, 2010, p. 130). In a way, pictures are better 
at controlling human behavior imperatively. The efficacy of visual norms has a biological-
anthropological explanation that will be later illustrated (see par. 4). Furthermore, the law is 
increasingly personalized (Cominelli, 2018, p. 182), and this revival of pictorial law could be 
at the same time a cause and a consequence of appealing to individual sensitivities (Boehme-
Neßler, 2010, p. 134). 
Semiotic studies have tried to overcome the lingering distrust by arguing that pictorial law 
has the same linguistic value as verbalized law. Studincki, for example, draws the distinction 
between normative road signs (the speed limit) and descriptive road signs (eg: the danger sign 
of a slippery road, or of wandering animals), and by doing this he implicitly seems to maintain 
that road signs are proper normative messages because they are a proper language themselves 
(Studnicki, 1970). 
More recently, Dudek (2018) criticizes the decisions by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and 
by the Polish Supreme Court on some aspects of the basic traffic sign categories in Poland 
(obligatory, prohibitory, informative and warning) moving from the perspective of semiotic 
theory. The case in point is a traffic sign informing of the need to pay a fee for a parking space. 
The judges argued that non-normative signs (informative and warning signs) were non-
separable from their normative basis. In another work, Dudek maintains that traffic signals, 
both as signs and realizations, are an integral part of the legal norms that are encoded in such 
provisions, and not a secondary part of them (Dudek, 2015, p. 366). 
And yet, it’s clear that even an informative sign, and above all a warning sign, can have a fully 
normative content, in the sense that they raise the minimum mandatory standard of diligence, 
1  In 2012, an amicus curiae brief submitted in an antitrust case to contest a settlement proposal by the Department 
of Justice, was drafted as a comic strip to comply with a length limit of 5 pages set by a US District Court 
Debra Cassens Weiss, Faced with a Five-Page Limit, Lawyer Files Cartoon Amicus Brief with Proper Font Size. Retrieved 
April 9, 2019, from the American Bar Association Journal website, http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
faced_with_a_five-page_limit_lawyer_files_cartoon_amicus_brief_with_proper_/
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which couldn’t have been predetermined without the knowledge of the road conditions. 
The depiction of a harmful event or dangerous situation, therefore calls for a greater level 
of attention and a higher standard of diligence, in the absence of which liability could be 
incurred.
I think however that a purely semiotic approach misses the mark, and I concur with those 
who have denounced the “verbal-centrism” that in general dominates the analysis of 
communicative interaction, and of legal interactions in particular (Moroni & Lorini, 2017, 
p. 319). Law operates through images, it is incorporated in images, and these images do not 
just represent the description of facts that are relevant for the law. These graphic rules “[do 
not] merely evoke or defer to other word-made regulations: graphic rules directly state 
prescriptions and influence possible behavior”; in traffic signs, “[f]or all practical purposes the 
arrow [sign] is the law” (Moroni & Lorini, 2017, p. 321). 
The problem that the sign may or may not be a reliable instrument for describing reality is 
a non-issue in social regulation. The debate between iconism and anti-iconisms in modern 
semiotics, discussing whether images and symbols, in particular, really incorporate at least 
partly what is being depicted, is in fact almost reminiscent of the debate between naturalism/
behaviorism and constructionism in the social sciences. Pictorial systems, just like sentential 
systems, make use of recurrent parts following systematic rules of combination (Camp, 2007; 
Westerhoff, 2005). Apories between pictorial rules are also possible, notwithstanding the 
debate on its linguistic nature, and it looks simply illogical to resolve the issue by downgrading 
graphic rules, as recently the Italian administrative courts seemed to do2, by stating that in 
case of contradictions, the written rule will prevail over the graphic rule (Moroni & Lorini, 
2017, p. 327). Just as verbal language, pictorial signs may be interpreted and misunderstood, as 
recent research shows with regard to increased fatality risks for international tourists in the 
countries of destination (Choocharukul & Sriroongvikrai, 2017, p. 4521).
I also take issue with an explicitly semiotic perspective (Pusceddu, 2017) that might reduce the 
normativity of signs to a problem of language. If according to semiotics, only a communication 
system with a discernible syntax may be linguistic (Pusceddu, 2017, p. 451), and such variable 
in some way in fact affects its normativity, I reply that then law is probably not (always) a 
communicative act.  
Cognitive processes in fact do not need words, nor the thought of words, either verbal or 
written, just like they do not need images. And as Lorini and Moroni remind us, it is for this 
reason that the comprehensibility of the verbal language vs. the pictorial language should not 
be a defining issue (Moroni & Lorini, 2017, pp. 330-331). Evolutionary psychology and cognitive 
ethology have proved that pre-verbal and pre-pictorial understanding of the world, and of its 
physical and moral constraints, already exists in newborn children (Robinson et al., 2007). 
Simple orders or directives may be conveyed just as clearly and certainly more quickly with 
pictures. As they are an analog mode of representation, pictures may also be potentially 
continuous and non-discrete, while sentential systems, with their highly symbolized and 
abstract symbols, cannot (Camp, 2007, p. 156). 
For this reason, road signs, as well as other signs placed in public places of passage and traffic, 
have always made extensive use of explanatory images, accompanied when necessary by 
brief verbal instructions. These signs represent a specification and a contextualization of the 
2  The principle, as recalled by Moroni and Lorini, and stated by the Italian supreme administrative tribunal 
(Consiglio di Stato, n. 673/2014) has been constantly reaffirmed in the recent Italian case-law (Consiglio di Stato, sect. 
IV, n. 2158/2013; Consiglio di Stato, sect. V, n. 4734/2003; Consiglio di Stato, sect. IV, n. 4462/2000; Consiglio di Stato, 
sect. V, n. 724/1995). 
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general rules of traffic laws, and are becoming increasingly essential to provide cognitive aid, 
given the speed of circulation and the variability of the surrounding conditions. It is on this 
cognitive aspect that I will concentrate in the following sections of the article, in order to 
understand the factual behavioral effects that the pictorial law has.
One of the most interesting aspects in terms of impact and effectiveness of rules that are 
incorporated into road signs, may be understood by focusing on the cognition process, and 
by on this cognition can be framed so that voluntary compliance is enhanced. Images play 
more on our cognitive “system 1”, that is, on our instinctual and automatic cognitive side, 
rather than on our “system 2”, that is, on its conscious and deliberate cognitive counterparty 
(Kahneman, 2011). This is almost necessary in the case of road signals, because these images 
have a message to relay in a short time-span. 
Even if the effect of communication through pictures may be up to a certain point controlled, 
(Boehme-Neßler, 2010, p. 153), the use of cognitive system 1 should ensure immediate and 
instinctive response to the stimulus. We know that even in deliberate decision-making 
contexts, such as in the courtroom, pictures may sway decisions: we discovered for example 
that brain-scan images presented as a proof in expert testimonies may effectively influence 
judges in their decisions on criminal cases (Baskin et al., 2007). 
In general terms, concrete and pictorial thinking prevents losing touch with reality. Images 
work directly with emotions and create “immersion effects” (Boehme-Neßler, 2010, p. 64). 
The capacity to react promptly to visual stimuli has been an evolutionary advantage for quite 
a lot of species, and therefore, complex animals have evolved a system of fast reaction to 
what images are prompting and to what can be captured at a glance. This is not what happens 
with text, which needs some level of consciousness, attentive processing and mental effort to 
be understood. In an experiment conducted with a test on 16 familiar road signs, at certain 
distances symbols were 50% more legible than written signs (Chan et al., 2016). It is indubitable 
that symbolic signs are more efficient, in that they provide the information that is needed, 
without further distractions. 
The different treatment that images and text receive from a cognition point of view in our 
brain has been described as “dual coding” (Paivio, 1971). Images, on the other hand, improve 
text understanding. In an experiment conducted on a computer-keyboard setting to measure 
reaction times to road signs, better results were obtained with a combination of graphics and 
text (Koyuncu & Amado, 2008, p. 108).
Even if they have different functions and in a sense compete between themselves as means 
of communication, images and texts are also complimentary and may blur into each other, 
when text for example assumes certain shapes and colors, or is sized differently according to 
its aim. The abstractness and formality of language does not free it completely from visuality 
and salience, although it preserves its superiority in terms of providing comprehensive and 
systematic descriptions of the world. 
Overall, it’s been demonstrated by empirical research that symbolic messages are generally 
more quickly recognizable and understandable, although this is not necessarily true for all 
symbols, at any distance and for any duration (Ells & Dewar, 1979, p. 167). When vision is 
restricted, the efficiency decrease in understanding is greater for verbal signs than for symbolic 
signs, which results in experimenters concluding that when there is no possibility to test on the 
field their efficacy, a symbolic sign should be preferred over text (Ells & Dewar, 1979, p. 168). 
Numerous other factors at the individual level have to be taken into account. For instance, 
older drivers have higher levels of routinary behavior, need for clarity and aversion towards 
ambiguity, while younger drivers are associated with unlawful, anxious and distracted driving 
(Kaplan et al., 2018, p. 420). 
4. How road signs 
affect behavior
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As I anticipated, it becomes essential to ascertain under which conditions road signals are 
more or less effective. As one might expect, flashing signs or visual signs that are activated 
on cue and by the passage of vehicles, produce notable reduction in speeds at junctions or 
dangerous curves, to the point that these cues are expected to exert an unconscious and 
automatic response in terms of higher prudence and control. Flashing warnings in general 
offer increased attentional conspicuity, if compared for example with the use of certain colors, 
such as red or yellow, that are traditionally associated with risk signaling (Charlton, 2006, p. 
504). 
Another interesting finding has been the noticeable effect in experienced drivers of the 
“priming” that happens with the repetition of road signs (Crundall & Underwood, 2001, p. 
187). In other words, for drivers that are more familiar with it, a priming signal of generic 
hazard may be particularly effective in eliciting a timely reaction to the subsequent probe 
signal, that indicates the real hazard. As anticipated, the effectiveness of such priming seems 
to be linked with the level of experience: novices have not developed yet that familiarity with 
the context that makes them automatically receptive of those clues (Crundall & Underwood, 
2001, p. 187). The additional precautions and limitation for newly licensed driver look then 
all the more reasonable, if novices take on average an additional 1,7 decimal of a second to 
correctly classify road scenes (Crundall & Underwood, 2001, p. 197). Novice drivers are not 
as apt in extracting visual information while driving, and therefore require greater cognitive 
energy to select and process all the relevant stimuli ( Crundall & Underwood, 2001, p. 198).  
The transmission of information that allows driving behavior to be modified seems not 
straightforward and explicit. Drivers happen to modify their driving behavior thanks to traffic 
signs but without even realizing it (Crundall & Underwood, 2001, p. 196). Such a dynamic 
might be assimilated to an hypothesis of nudge (Sunstein, 2015; Thaler & Sunstein, 2009), and I 
am going to discuss some implications of this discovery in the next section. 
These kinds of experiments, which are conducted most of the times in artificial settings, 
naturally have a potential problem of ecological validity with respect to the research context. 
The actual pressure that the driver is subjected to in the natural context could lead to 
reactions of a different nature or extension. However, these results have been substantially 
confirmed (especially in the Crundall experiments) even with the most realistic driving 
simulators. In the same way, another common method of investigation, that is interviewing 
the driver in a real road setting, is normally conducted with a temporal frame that does not 
exclude the presence of intervening factors that confuse and influence the results. 
Legislation on road signs and traffic laws are not always a factor in the different degree of 
visual cognitive impact of road signs. Road signs are designed to take into account aspects such 
as visibility or size, but they do not acknowledge the subtle difference between automatically 
processed and deliberately processed information. In most cases, the physical features of signs 
are considered just as an aid for a better conscious perceptual activity, and not a constitutive 
or defining part in themselves.
The awareness of cognitive mechanisms and biases (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000) is now taking 
hold even in social and legal policies, and this is what is analyzed in the present section, 
expounding some experimental or relatively new forms of signals that factor into their design 
these behavioral insights. In a legal world of increasing complexity and over-regulation 
(Caterina, 2008), the plethora of norms is translated into a plethora of signs. However, excess 
of information causes a lack of attention on the part of drivers, who end up forgetting most 
of the signs (Kaplan et al., 2018, p. 416). Speaking or listening also creates an ulterior motive 
for fatigue for the driver, and brings about unwise decisions. One of the single most worrying 
causes of accidents today is distraction due to the use or mobile phones or other multimedia 
5. How road signs 
are evolving
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equipment while driving (Chan et al., 2016). The problem that was once a lack of information 
and not enough signage (and in some areas of the world it still is), today has probably turned 
into an overload thereof (Picture 1 and Picture 2). In this respect, road sign are expected to 
become more self-explanatory and adhere to the principles of “sustainable safety” (Wegman et 
al., 2008): functionality and adherence to a hierarchical structure; homogeneity with regard to 
speed and directionality; predictability in terms of interpretative outcomes. 
         
Picture 1             Picture 2
As Pardo and Patterson correctly point out, there is no such thing as “unconscious rule 
following”, but it’s true that certain behavior and attitudes may be oriented through signals 
that are mainly perceived through “cognitive system 1” (Pardo & Patterson, 2015, p. 178). 
A clear practical application of this latter insight is the increasing use of active speed warning 
signs, that is, those signs that actively respond to the driver’s conduct (Picture 3). Active 
signals of this kind obtained an average reduction of speed of 5,8 miles in correspondence 
with the sign, and of 2,9 miles after 0,2 miles. With subsequent intermittent police controls, 
this reduction was respectively 6,1 and 5,9 miles, with a decrease of 34,9% of those speeds 
exceeding by more than 10 miles per hour the limit (Bloch, 1998). 
                    Picture 3
In some versions, active signals also spell the consequence of the driving behaviors, such 
as the possible penalties in the driving licence point-system (Picture 4), or provide a “social 
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feedback”, by thanking or smiling at the driver who is respecting the speed limit (Picture 5). 
These signs report in real time non-compliance with the standard, or they may say “thank 
you” in cases of compliance. Such signals have become particularly common when entering 
urban areas after a long stretch on a faster road. 
      Picture 4   Picture 5
Active systems should be particularly effective, as they do not only remind the driver of what 
their actual speed is: drivers could do this by looking at speedometer on the car’s cockpit, 
but it’s certainly easier to look at it without taking the eyes off of the road. What is even 
more effective in the second version, which provides a feedback to the adequacy of speed, is 
the feeling that problematic behavior might be exposed. It’s not necessarily the discomfort 
that comes from being recorded by “big brother”, because in these active systems, there is 
no direct recording of the actual speed, and no penalty or fine may be expected from the 
signaling system itself. It is rather the unconscious social pressure that one’s driving behavior 
is being watched that produces compliance. Behaviors oriented by rules always have a social 
dimension, in that we tend to act in concert with others, and to be affected unconsciously by 
what we think the others will think of us (Pardo & Patterson, 2015, p. 183).
This is the same collective logic behind the idea of the “watching eye”, that is, those 
traditional symbolic amulets that are recurrent in several cultures and picture a stylized eye 
image. While apparently these eye cues were supposed to work against sorcery or bad luck, it 
has been hypothesized that they also worked by making its bearer better-behaved (so avoiding 
creating enemies or inflicting self-harm through anti-social behavior). In many other contexts, 
there seems to be in fact a similar “watching eye effect” that makes people behave differently 
independent of deliberative evaluation of the costs and benefits of one’s action, and that 
increases law-abiding and cooperative behavior (Bateson et al., 2006; Haley & Fessler, 2005). 
In the meta-research conducted by Dear and colleagues, unlawful behavior decreased by 35% 
in presence of eye cues, whereas CCTV cameras obtained a reduction in crime of just 16% (Dear 
et al., 2019, p. 269). In the study by Haley and Fessler, “watching eyes” increased generosity in 
games of economic cooperation between 31% and 55%, depending on the clarity of the cue. 
Several other low-cost, low-intrusion campaigns working by the same principle have been put 
in place in order to prevent and reduce bicycle theft, petty crime on trains and littering by 
drivers, with seemingly good results (Dear et al., 2019, p. 271). 
The perception of collective control would therefore have stronger effects than actual control. 
One explanatory hypothesis behind such puzzling behavior may be derived from evolutionary 
131
ANALYZING TRAFFIC SIGNS THROUGH A SOCIO-COGNITIVE APPROACH
psychology (Barkow et al., 1992): we evolved a pronounced sensitivity towards being watched, 
at first in order to protect us from predators, and subsequently to protect our reputation in 
wider social systems. Considering the relatively lower costs of these visual cues, of which the 
active-speed feedbacks described above represents the analogous function (Picture 5), it is 
surprising how these signals are not as widespread. 
The same kind of measures might be expected to be implemented shortly for all road users, 
e.g. for the pedestrian or cyclists, in order to prevent jaywalking in dangerous areas or other 
forms of rule-breaking that might be particularly self-harming. Synthetic vision and artificial 
reconnaissance technologies should allow all this and make it cost effective, and any necessary 
means to anonymize such systems, so to preserve data privacy and human dignity, is already 
there to be put in place. 
As previously suggested, these signs may be another form of “nudging”. They are relatively 
cheap, and they do not threaten drivers with ticket and fines. Nudges are in fact opposed 
to “command and control” types of regulations, because they do not imply the application 
of sanctions or material incentives. We are dealing here with nudges aimed at compliance. 
Punitive regulation shall continue to exist, but these signals persuade the user of the road, 
though unconsciously, that compliance with the rules is important and is in her/his interest. 
The same thing cannot be said for those semi-automated systems of coercion (in-built speed 
limitation, or the loud warnings playing in cars until everyone has fastened their seat-belt), 
which need sophisticated sensors to be installed, adding significantly to the cost of vehicles.
The literature on nudges is now extensive (Baldwin, 2014; Barton & Grüne-Yanoff, 2015; 
Haugh, 2017; Wilkinson, 2013), and using road signs as a case in point, it seems interesting to 
point out the initiative of the province of Bolzano, in Italy, which uses suggestive images to 
target risky road behaviors (Picture 6, 7, 8). Pictorial nudges have been already widely used 
to discourage smoking (Rousu & Thrasher, 2013). These powerful and shocking messages 
recall the tragic and permanent consequences of what, without the advantage of hindsight, 
would appear as marginal acts of imprudence. They are placed at the roadside, on large 
billboards, just like any other road sign. Another example is the informative nudge that 
appears on the highway panels of the Italian motorway network, which provide statistics 
on accidents. In both cases, to our knowledge there are no studies on the impact of these 
measures. 
Picture 6             Picture 7         Picture 8
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A further development to be expected is that of the speed limit or hazard signals that adapt 
to environmental and traffic conditions (out-of-car Intelligent Transport Systems - ITS). With 
the necessary technological and regulatory innovations, the speed limits shown by these signs 
could be made dynamic, that is, variable according to the aforementioned conditions.
Speed limits that are not linked inflexibly with a road section, but that may be adjusted to 
traffic, weather, visibility, or even to the driver’s psychological status, may appear more 
“credible” and “logical in the given circumstances”, and more easily followed as a result 
(Wegman et al., 2007, p. 336). “In-car ITS” may also be programmed to automatically recognize 
road signs and speed limits, even when driven in manual mode, and act consequently. 
In this article, I tried to delimit a field of investigation for possible empirical investigation 
on the effectiveness of road signs, by defining preliminarily some fundamental concepts in 
the field of road safety, and secondly by highlighting the issues that I considered relevant 
from the linguistic point of view. In so doing, I took a position on the limits of a purely 
semiotic perspective in the study of a social phenomenon such as that of compliance with 
rules. In this regard, I felt that a normative-semiotic perspective could be integrated by a 
cognitive perspective, meaning with this latter the overall multidisciplinary approach that 
seeks to outline a theory of behavior in relation to delimited social and normative contexts, 
so integrating insights from both the natural and the social sciences and achieving higher 
degrees of precision and predictability. 
Road behavior is usefully analyzable, and therefore orientable, also through the tools of 
evolutionary psychology, behavioral psychology, and sociology. I believe that at this moment, 
research that looks at the ecological individual reaction with respect to the social context, can 
contribute greatly to the field, and I have illustrated this in the section dedicated to empirical 
research. It is true that in a few decades, the issues of safety and road signs might be a problem 
of the past, since it is likely that a risky activity such as driving vehicles on public roads, unless 
for recreational purposes, will be completely entrusted to automated intelligent systems. 
However, manual driving, or at least mixed forms between manual driving and automatic 
driving, will be with us for some time, and therefore it makes sense, given the current 
considerable human and economic impact of road accidents, to ask oneself about the problem 
of compliance with traffic laws.
Research on road signs becomes particularly relevant as a consequence of the recovery of 
visuality in modern communication. Indeed, one of the most interesting empirical hypotheses 
to verify will be that such forms of nudge or “emotional moral suasion”, may prove in the end 
particularly effective when coupled with traditional forms of regulation and punishment. 
The request to reach quickly large masses of people has undoubtedly contributed to this. 
There is a need to reduce complexity and to communicate instructions and warnings 
effectively and rapidly. Focusing on the emotional aspect, however, does not necessarily 
mean appealing to the pure “populist” instincts (Boehme-Neßler, 2010, p. 137). I have argued 
that signaling harmful behavior by underlining risks in an individualized way, needn’t be 
incompatible with human dignity, provided this hasn’t direct consequences in terms of 
sanctions and punishment. Finding a balance between words and images is also a challenge 
for the law, as it is no longer reasonable to retain the idea that the latter is always inferior and 
subordinate to the former. 
6. Conclusion
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